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Kant on Concepts, or Was Kant Frege? 
(Sarah Tietz) 
 
In discussions on the nature of concepts there are some philosophers who claim that 
both, Frege and Kant, had the same idea on what concepts are. They say that Kant as 
well as Frege determined concepts via their functional role as predicates of possible 
judgments. And they conclude that for both, Kant and Frege, there is a priority of 
propositional or judgeable contents over the contents of the judgment’s parts. One of 
those philosophers is Robert Brandom. He speaks for example of “Frege’s Kantian 
insistence on the priority of the propositional” or that “He (Frege) embraces Kant’s 
insight that the notion of content must be made intelligible first for judgments.” (MIE, 
95) This way of talking, however, does not seem to be in accordance with the way in 
which the story of the rise of analytic philosophy of language is told. For this story 
always begins with Frege and his then new insights in the nature of concepts as 
functions, whose value when complemented by an argument is always a truth-value. 
Concepts for Frege are unsaturated. They are always in need of complementation to 
be of any use, at all. That is, for Frege concepts alone do not have content, but only in 
the context of a judgment. That’s why according to Frege we have to understand 
concepts as predicates of possible judgments. The reason why he thought so can be 
found in his “Boole’s Logical Calculus and the Begriffsschrift”. There he writes: “In 
Aristotle, as in Boole, the logically primitive activity is the formation of concepts by 
abstraction, and judgment and inference enter in through an immediate or indirect 
comparison of concepts via their extensions.” (ibid., 16) That is, according to this 
approach we first have two terms, one singular, one universal, and in a second step 
these terms are concatenated via the so called copula to a judgment. Judgments in this 
tradition then are concatenated entities of the form Subject-Copula-Concept. The 
problem with this approach should be obvious. If the parts of a judgment are self-
contained entities it is difficult to explain how they together can make up a single 
semantic unity, that is, a judgment. Frege thought this problem to be solvable only by 
turning the order of explanation upside-down. “Instead of putting a judgment together 
out of an individual as subject and an already previously formed concept as predicate, 
we do the opposite and arrive at a concept by splitting up the content of a possible 
judgment.” (ibid., 17) The result of this splitting up is that concepts have to be 
 2 
predicates of possible judgments. They must be unsaturated entities that cannot be 
gained by a process of abstraction.  
Now, if all this was already known by Kant, that is, if these insights of Frege actually 
were Kantian insights in the first place why is the history of analytic philosophy of 
language told by beginning with Frege? Is it due to mere ignorance on the side of the 
storytellers? In order to give an answer to these questions one of course has to know 
what Kant thought on the nature of concepts. Though I am myself no expert of 
Kantian philosophy, in what follows, I shall try to develop an idea of Kant’s 
understanding of concepts. Hereby I will concentrate mainly on the so called 
metaphysical deduction in the Critique of Pure Reason. For it is there that Kant 
explains what concepts and judgments are.  
The metaphysical deduction or “The Leading Thread for the Discovery of All Pure 
Concepts of the Understanding” has to be seen as a further step in Kant’s enterprise of 
giving an answer to the question of “How are synthetic a priori judgments possible?” 
(B 19). The Transcendental Aesthetic was the first step. There he considered the role 
of a priori forms of sensibility, space and time, as modes of ordering manifolds. 
(A20/B34) Only by means of such orderings, he says, do sensations yield intuitions of 
objects, i.e. representations that are immediate and singular. What needs to be done 
then is a consideration of the role of a priori forms of the understanding. For, 
according to Kant the human representational activities are dual. Objects are 
recognized as the kinds of objects they are only by being thought under concepts, but 
it is the sensibility by which these objects are given. Thus, just as there are a priori 
forms of sensibility by means of which sensible manifolds are combined and ordered 
in intuition, there also have to be a priori forms of understanding by means of which 
objects in general are thought under concepts. The collaboration of both forms, then, 
may ground the possibility of a priori cognition of objects.  
What Kant is concerned with thus is transcendental logic. For contrary to general 
logic transcendental logic does not merely consider the form of thought – whatever its 
content may be. Transcendental logic considers the content of thought as well, namely 
insofar as thought relates to objects a priori. The question transcendental logic seeks 
to answer, then, is: How does the understanding relate any of its concepts, including 
categories or pure concepts, to objects in general? 
Since our concern is whether it is Kant and not Frege who has to be seen as the true 
ancestor of analytic philosophy of language, in what follows I won’t concentrate on 
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the a priori role of the forms of sensibility and understanding. Rather, I shall 
concentrate mainly on Kant’s notion of concepts in general and the role they play in 
judgments.  
One of the distinctions Kant draws between intuitions and concepts is that the latter 
rest on functions, while intuitions rest on affections. (A68/B93) By affections Kant 
means the merely passive faculty of receptivity. Functions, by contrast have 
something to do with the spontaneity of thinking. In order to understand why this 
should be so we need to understand what Kant means by “functions” in this context. 
This will turn out to be a quite difficult task. Kant characterizes function as “the unity 
of the act of ordering different representations under a common representation.” 
(A68/B93) Accordingly, functions have something to do with the ordering of 
representations under a common one. The paradigmatic cases of such orderings are of 
course judgments. Here, a representation that relates directly to an object is subsumed 
under another representation that holds for many other representations. Those 
representations that are related to other representations are called concepts. Their 
nature is discursive. That is, concepts never hold immediately for an object. Their 
relation to an object is always mediated by other representations, one of which, the 
intuition, refers to this object directly. Kant’s example is the judgment “All bodies are 
divisible”. Here, “the concept of the divisible is related to various other concepts; 
among these, however, it is here particularly related to the concept of body, and that 
in turn is related to certain appearances that come before us.” (A68f./B93) 
We see that both, concepts as well as judgments, order representations under a 
common one. And indeed, of concepts, Kant writes, the understanding can make no 
other use than that of judging by means of them. (A68/B93) But how can concepts 
rest on functions, if functions are determined as “the unity of the act of ordering 
different representations under a common representation”? What is the unity of this 
act of ordering?  
There seem to be at least three possibilities to understand this notion of unity. 
According to the first possibility, unity is exactly that which is created by concepts. 
After all it is concepts by which representations are ordered under a common one. If 
this reading were the correct interpretation of the notions of function and unity, it 
would not be possible to see Kant as an early exponent of Frege’s theory of concepts. 
For if judgments are seen as unities that are created by self-contained entities, i.e. by 
concepts, they cannot have semantic priority over their parts. But this reading cannot 
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be right. The problem with it is of course that concepts, according to Kant, should rest 
on functions. Hence, they cannot create functions, or the unity by which functions are 
characterized. The same reason would hold, of course, if concepts were characterized 
as identical with functions, that is, with unity. Therefore I won’t consider the latter as 
a separate possibility to understand the notion of unity. 
According to a second reading, unity can be something like a rule on which concepts 
rest. This reading might be very attractive if it were possible to understand judgments 
as those rules on which concepts rest. And there, indeed seem to be good reasons to 
consider judgments as rules for concepts. For, as we have seen, concepts are used in 
judgments only. As discursive representations, their relation to objects is always 
mediated by other representations. And this mediation characteristically takes place in 
judgments. That is, concepts would then rest on a unity which is characteristically 
performed in judgments. Now, judgments have a specific form. In a judgment, the 
representation that subsumes another representation can never adopt the grammatical 
part of the subject-term. Hence, if concepts rested on judgments, judgments, by virtue 
of their form, would determine the grammatical status of concepts. Concepts, then, 
would have to be predicates of possible judgments. And, this seems to be the way in 
which Kant wishes to define concepts since he himself speaks of concepts as 
predicates of possible judgments. (A69/B94) 
This second reading, then, is very attractive indeed. For if judgments really are those 
functions on which concepts rest, we have good reasons to conceive of concepts as 
functional entities that can play a role only in the context of judgments. That is, we 
have good reasons to find a characterization of concepts in Kant that comes very close 
to the one Frege gave. For, concepts understood as representations related to objects 
via other representations could then be characterized as predicates of possible 
judgments. And, better still, judgments could turn out to be the basic semantic unity. 
Concepts, according to this second reading, then, rest on judgments, and judgments 
are those functions, that is, they are the unity of the act of ordering different 
representations under a common one. Now, Kant concludes his analysis of the 
example “All bodies are divisible” by saying that “All judgments are functions of 
unity among our representations.” (A69/B94) But, of course “functions of unity” is 
different from “unity of the act”. And it was the latter by which Kant characterized 
functions earlier. How, then, are these two formulations related? A suggestion, 
Béatrice Longuenesse has made, is to take “functions of unity” as “functions bringing 
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unity into…” Thus judgments would be instances of “’unities of the act of ordering 
different representations under a common representation’ and as such, ‘functions of 
unity among our representations’, i.e. functions which bring unity into our 
representations.”  
It seems the second reading could be sustained. Another benefit of it is that it is in 
accordance with Kant’s claim that “We can reduce all acts of the understanding to 
judgments, so that the understanding in general can be called a capacity to judge.” 
(A69/B94) For, by this claim Kant excludes the possibility of there being other 
entities to play the role of functions.  
As attractive as this second reading appears there still seems to be a third reading of 
the notions of unity and function to be found in Kant. On this reading, function still is 
a rule on which concepts rest. But this rule, however, would not be the unity of 
judgments. For now, judgments themselves would be entities formed according to this 
rule of unity, whereas the categories, i.e. the pure concepts of the understanding, 
would have to be seen as the rule of their unity. For, the “culminating statement” 
(Longuenesse) of the Leading Thread chapter is the following: “The same function, 
which gives unity to the various representations in a judgment also gives unity to the 
mere synthesis of various representations in an intuition, which, expressed 
universally, is called a pure concept of the understanding.” (A79/B104f.) Of course, 
this statement itself is deeply in need of explanation, even if one concentrates only on 
its ambiguity – as I will do here. It seems that the second “which” that is called a pure 
concept of the understanding can refer to “unity” as well as to “the same function”. If 
it refers to “unity”, then function can mean what the second reading already said, 
namely that it is judgments which bring unity into our representations. But if this 
“which” refers to “the same function” then the categories seem to be the ultimate 
principle of unity. That is, it does not seem to be the judgment itself anymore but this 
function, i.e. the category that is the rule of unity which is followed by the 
combination of representations to a judgment. This second possibility seems to be 
supported by Kant’s explanation of the role categories are to play. In the Transition to 
the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories, after having determined categories 
as “concepts of an object in general, by means of which its intuition is regarded as 
determined with regard to one of the logical functions for judgments” (B 128) he 
points out that in regard to the merely logical use of the understanding it does remain 
undetermined which of the two concepts in the judgment “All bodies are divisible” 
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would have to have the status of the predicate and which the status of the subject. “For 
one can also say: ‘Something divisible is a body.’ Through the category of substance, 
however, if I bring the concept of body under it, it is determined that its empirical 
intuition in experience must always be considered as subject, never as mere predicate; 
and likewise with all other categories.” (B129) Hence, if the second “which” in the 
sentence “The same function, which gives unity to the various representations in a 
judgment also gives unity to the mere synthesis of various representations in an 
intuition, which, expressed universally, is called a pure concept of the understanding.” 
refers to “the same function”, then categories seem to be those functions that give 
unity – or better the right kind of unity to various representations in a judgment. What 
can this mean? I think it means – though I am not sure – that categories provide the 
means by which judgments, considered not only with regard to their form but with 
regard to their content as well, can be ways of recognition. For it is by these 
categories that both, a single representation of an object, i.e. an intuition can be 
ordered under a general one, and that a given manifold can be synthesized to an 
intuition, in the first place. Only in this way is it possible to form a judgment that is 
not only of the right form but also has content. That is to say, the categories as well as 
any other concept order given representations under a single representation. The 
difference between categories and other concepts is that the former make sure that the 
latter can have any content at all. For, categories, as Kant aims to show in the 
following Transcendental Deduction are the rules according to which a given 
manifold is synthesized to an intuition. But since categories are concepts, too, their 
performance requires the existence of judgments.  
Thus, categories seem to rest on functions in the same way as ordinary concepts do, at 
least as far as the form of judgments is concerned. For, with regard to the content of  
judgments it is necessary that the delivered sensible content is synthesized according 
to a rule. Since it is only then that sensible content has a form that enables it to be 
integrated into a judgment.  
If this is correct, then the third reading does not differ in principle from the second. 
Both, ordinary concepts as well as categories rest qua being concepts on judgments. 
The difference between ordinary concepts and categories is that the latter make sure 
that the former can have content at all. For categories supply the unity on which the 
synthesis of a given manifold in an intuition rests. But since categories qua being 
concepts are bound to judgments as to their form, the synthetic unity of an intuition 
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ultimately rests on judgments. That is, judgments indeed seem to be the basic unity 
for Kant. They are the functions that bring unity into representations – analytically, 
insofar as the ordering of a single representation under a general is concerned, 
synthetically, insofar as the ordering of manifolds to an intuition is concerned.  
Thus Kant indeed appears to be the true ancestor of analytic philosophy of language, 
at least, if this means the adoption of a different point of view for answering the 
question of what concepts are.  
But why is it that Frege’s characterization of concepts as functions or predicates of 
possible judgments is treated as a then new insight? There are presumably several 
answers that can be given. First of all, the purely practical answer. It is very difficult 
to understand Kant’s somewhat outdated German, much more difficult at least as it is 
to understand Frege’s. Another reason might be that the Kantian enterprise is 
transcendental. And transcendental philosophy is hardly what contemporary analytic 
philosophers are crazy about. A third reason might be the following. It seems at least 
possible to understand the Kantian determination of judgments not only in a Fregean 
way but in the Aristotelian tradition, as well. As is well known, judgments in this 
tradition can be seen as combinations of representations or terms, such that, for 
example one of them is singular and stands for an object, while the other is universal 
and gained by a process of abstraction. These representations then are related via the 
so called copula to form a unity, the judgment. The problem of this approach I have 
mentioned in the beginning. If judgments are understood as concatenations of self-
contained entities it is difficult to explain how these entities can make up a single 
semantic unity.  
To be sure, it is not easy to place Kant’s notion of judgments in this Aristotelian 
tradition. First of all, unlike in the Aristotelian tradition he doesn’t use the notion of 
synthesis in the context of judgments. On the contrary, he uses it in the context of 
intuitions. It is only intuitions Kant considers as synthesized unities. And it is an open 
question whether this synthesis is conceptually structured. But even if it were 
conceptually structured, this synthesis does rest on the same function that gives unity 
to several representations in a judgment. And as we have seen this function is the 
judgment as the unity of the act of ordering different representations under a common 
one.  
So where can formulations be found in Kant that make it at least possible to see him 
as somebody who had not completely overcome the Aristotelian tradition? To be sure, 
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the textual basis might appear quite meager. But there are some places. The most 
explicit formulations I have found are neither in the metaphysical nor in the 
transcendental deduction but in Section IV of the Doctrine of Elements, the 
Impossibility of an ontological proof. There Kant aims at showing that being is no real 
predicate. Instead he considers being “in the logical use” as “the copula of a 
judgment”. “The proposition ‘God is omnipotent’ contains two concepts that have 
their respective objects: God and omnipotence; the little word ‘is’ is not a predicate in 
it, but only that which posits the predicate in relation to the subject.” (A529f./B626f.) 
Here we have all components of an Aristotelian theory of judgment: two concepts, 
“God” and “omnipotence”, and a copula that relates these concepts to one another. 
The result is the judgment “God is omnipotent”. The terms “God” and “omnipotent” 
Kant seems to consider as semantically self-contained. For, he characterizes them as 
concepts that have their objects, namely God and omnipotence. This is exactly what is 
claimed by an Aristotelian or a so called synthesis-theory of judgment. Here, 
judgments are understood as relations, that is, as created unities. And concepts, 
accordingly, may have the function of the predicate term, but they don’t need to. For 
they too designate an object, may it be an attribute, a universal, a form, a property or 
an idea.  
If Kant would had taken his view, that concepts are predicates of possible judgments, 
in its full consequence he could not have considered concepts as having objects. For if 
they are characterized as predicates of possible judgments, concepts don’t have any 
object at all anymore. The only thing they can do is to be true of the term that refers to 
an object. What follows is, firstly, that in judgments there can be no copula that 
concatenates two semantically self-contained terms. For, what was once the copula 
must now be part of the predicate. That is, the predicate of the judgment “God is 
omnipotent” can neither be “omnipotent” nor “omnipotence” but must be “is 
omnipotent”. The second consequence is that judgments cannot be considered as 
relations anymore. If concepts are predicates of possible judgments, it is judgments 
that are the basic unity.  
Now, that we know some ingredients of an Aristotelian theory of judgment, it might 
be possible to make out some of these ingredients even in the metaphysical deduction. 
This is not easy. I think I can make out two. What is most obvious is that according to 
his table of judgments Kant considers all judgments as instances of relations, be this 
relation categorical, hypothetical or disjunctive. But as we have just seen, if 
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judgments are the basic semantic unities they cannot be relations. At least the 
categorical judgment must be considered as a single unit.  
The second ingredient of an Aristotelian theory of judgments is that Kant nowhere in 
the metaphysical deduction determines predicates in the correct truth-functional way. 
In his example-judgment “All bodies are divisible” he speaks of “the concept of the 
divisible” instead of the predicate “are divisible”. And additionally he characterizes 
concepts as general representations that hold of many other representations. That is, 
Kant conceives of the use of concepts as relations of subsumption. But if concepts are 
predicates they don’t subsume other representations but are or at least can be true of 
them.  
It seems that Kant did not fully dissociate from the Aristotelian tradition, though, of 
course his paving the way for a new conception of concepts and judgments cannot be 
appreciated enough. Let’s come back then to the questions asked in the beginning. 
Can Kant be seen as the true ancestor of analytic philosophy of language? The answer 
should be yes, I think. But was he Frege? No, he wasn’t.  
